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To identify the safety issues associated with hydrogen fueling stations, incidents at such
stations in Japan and the USA were analyzed considering the regulations in these coun-
tries. Leakage due to the damage and fracture of main bodies of apparatuses and pipes in
Japan and the USA is mainly caused by design error, that is, poorly planned fatigue.
Considering the present incidents in these countries, adequate consideration of the usage
environment in the design is very important. Leakage from flanges, valves, and seals in
Japan is mainly caused by screw joints. If welded joints are to be used in hydrogen fueling
stations in Japan, strength data for welded parts should be obtained and pipe thicknesses
should be reduced. Leakage due to other factors, e.g., external impact, in Japan and the USA
is mainly caused by human error. To realize self-serviced hydrogen fueling stations, safety
measures should be developed to prevent human error by fuel cell vehicle users.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of Hydrogen Energy Publications
LLC. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/).Introduction
Hydrogen fueling stations are essential elements for operating
fuel cell vehicles (FCVs). Alazemi et al. reported that by 2013,, hydrogen incident repo
ed Sciences, Yokohama
993.
ac.jp (A. Miyake).
r Ltd on behalf of Hydrogen Enthere were 224 working hydrogen stations distributed over 28
countries and that some 43% of these stations were located in
North and South America, 34% in Europe, 23% in Asia, and
none in Australia [1]. In Japan, in March 2010, the Fuel Cell
Commercialization Conference of Japan proposed the rolloutrting database; HIAD, hydrogen incident and accident database.
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recommended ways to popularize them by 2025 [2]. In March
2016, the Japan Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
announced its aim to construct 320 hydrogen fueling stations
by 2025. Moreover, a Japanese motor corporation has been
selling commercial FCVs since December 2014, and other
companies are poised to enter the FCV market as well.
Therefore, it has become increasingly necessary to establish
hydrogen fueling stations.
Hydrogen fueling stations have the following two safety
issues [3]: (i) The hydrogen pressure encountered in Japanese
stations is very high at 82 MPa. (ii) Explosion and fire are very
likely to occur due to hydrogen's inherent characteristics:
hydrogen is likely to leak because of its low density, large
flammability range, and low minimum ignition energy. In
addition, hydrogen embrittlement must be taken into
consideration to ensure safety. Therefore, it is very important
to assess the risk of hydrogen fueling stations.
Many studies have focused on risk assessment and ana-
lyses with respect to hydrogen and hydrogen fueling stations
from different points of view [3e13]. These studies include
research on hydrogen explosion and fire [4e8], hydrogen
compatibility of materials [9e12], and the identification and
analysis of hazardous scenarios in hydrogen fueling stations
using hazard and operability studies, a hazard identification
study, failuremode and effect analysis, fault tree analysis, and
other methods [13e28]. Serious hazards in hydrogen fueling
stations have also been analyzed in depth [29,30]. Meanwhile,
to improve the safety of hydrogen fueling stations by the
identification of overlooked incident scenarios, the causes of
the incidents have been identified and improvements to pre-
vent such incidents have been suggested [3]. However, only
few researches have focused on incident analysis with regard
to hydrogen fueling stations.
Table 1 presents the incident and accident database for
hydrogen and hydrogen fueling stations. Considering the data
for Japan reported in the High Pressure Gas Safety Act Data-
base, Yamada et al. [3] analyzed the incidents using the clas-
sification method [31]. The classification method was
developed by the present authors. The advantage of this
method is that it can categorize the causes of incidents, such
as material damage, sealing part problems, human error, and
others. The method was adopted as part of the High Pressure
Gas Safety Act in Japan. Mirza et al. [32] selected 32 incidents
involving hydrogen from the Hydrogen Incident Reporting
Database (HIRD), analyzed the incident causes, and suggested
safety measures. The Hydrogen Incident and Accident Data-
base (HIAD) [33] describes two accidents involving hydrogenTable 1 e Database of hydrogen incidents and accidents.
Database name Country/area of
incident
occurrence
Number of incidents (number
of hydrogen fueling station
incidents)
High Pressure Gas
Safety Act
Database
Japan (2005e2014) (21)
HIRD USA (2004e2012) 216 (22) 2016/2/23 access
HIAD Entire world 271 (2) 2016/2/24 accessfueling stations in Europe. Thus, accidents involving hydrogen
fueling stations in Japan and those involving hydrogen around
the world are already being collected and investigated. How-
ever, no uniformity exists in the analysis of hydrogen fueling
stations around the world. This is because the number of ac-
cidents involving hydrogen fueling stations is small consid-
ering that the technology is relatively new and it is difficult to
compare accidents involving hydrogen fueling stations
located in different areas due to regulatory differences [34].
The purpose of this study is to determine common causes
of incidents and accidents involving hydrogen fueling sta-
tions. To achieve the aim, we extracted incidents and acci-
dents involving hydrogen fueling stations in Japan and the
USA from the High Pressure Gas Safety Act Database and
HIRD. The method previously proposed by the authors was
applied to the incidents, and we succeeded in achieving a
uniform classification of incidents involving hydrogen fueling
stations in Japan and the USA. Moreover, we analyzed the
incidents with regard to the regulations in Japan and the USA.Classification of incidents and accidents
Method for incident and accident classification
In this study, the incidents and accidents were classified into
six categories using ourmethodwhile referring to the incident
response manual of the High Pressure Gas Safety Act [31]: (i)
Leakage I: leakage due to the damage and fracture of main
bodies of apparatuses and pipes (including welded parts). (ii)
Leakage II: leakage from flanges, valves, and seals (including
deteriorated nonmetallic seals). (iii) Leakage III: leakage due to
other factors, e.g., human error and external impact. (iv) Ex-
plosion and fire. (v) Burst and fracture. (vi) Others.
The collected data include the incidents and accidents
involving several types of hydrogen fueling stations. In Japan,
the types of hydrogen fueling stations considered in this study
are onsite-type hydrogen fueling stations using natural gas
and other resources and offsite-type hydrogen fueling sta-
tions, which receive gaseous hydrogen and liquid hydrogen
from other locations and store them. In the USA, some
hydrogen fueling stations considered in this study are of the
offsite type using liquid hydrogen and the type of the other
stations is unknown.
It should be noted that considerable differences exist be-
tween the data for Japan and the USA, e.g., in terms of the duty
of accident reporting and the standard of accidents. Moreover,Database administrator
High Pressure Gas Safety Institute of Japan
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, USA
European Commission's Joint Research Center, Petten, Netherlands
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dents have been reported for inclusion in the database.Comparison of incidents and accidents between Japan and
the USA
Table 2 presents the classification of incident and accidents
involving hydrogen fueling stations in Japan based on the
High Pressure Gas Safety Act Database. The total number of
incidents and accidents in Japan from 2005 to 2014 is 21.
Leakage II was themost frequently reported type of leakage in
hydrogen fueling stations in Japan with 14 cases. Most of the
leakage II incidents were caused by inadequate torque and
sealing. Table 3 presents the classification of the incidents and
accidents involving hydrogen fueling stations in the USA
based on the HIRD data. The total number of incidents in the
USA from 2004 to 2012 is 22.
With regard to leakage I in Japan and the USA, the apparatus
and part of leakage differ depending on the incidents and acci-
dents; however, the common cause ismainly design error, that
is, poorly planned fatigue. More precisely, the vibration fatigue
ofpipingjointsandthefatigueoffillinghosescausedthe leakage
incidents in Japan.Ontheotherhand, the fatigueoffillinghoses,
fatigue ofwelded parts of pipes, use of nonconformingmaterial
for pressure relief valves, and poormaintenance of filling hoses
caused the leakage incidents in the USA.With regard to leakage
II in Japan and theUSA, the number of leakage II incidents is the
largest. It is noteworthy that leakage from screw joints occurs
frequently in Japan. The causes of the leakage from screw joints
in Japan are inadequate torque, inadequate sealing, and
manufacturing error. With regard to leakage III, the cause of all
the incidents in the USA is human error. In the USA, one of the
incidents involved hydrogen leakage from a filling hose, which
was damaged because of an erroneous start by an FCV user. On
the other hand, the causes in Japan are human error and a
natural disaster.Table 2 e Classification of incidents and accidents involving h
Incident type Apparatus & part
Leakage I (3) Piping joint (screw joint)
Filling hose
Filling hose
Leakage II (14) Joint between coupler and filling hose
Joint between coupler and filling hose
Joint in compressor (screw joint)
Joint between dispenser and filling ho
Joint between compressor and accum
Joint (screw joint)
Joint of compressor's outlet (screw joi
Joint in liquid hydrogen pipeline (scre
Joint in accumulator (screw joint)
Joint in accumulator (screw joint)
Joint (flange joint)
Joint in compressor
Valve between accumulator and disp
FCV's filling port
Leakage III (2) Joint in accumulator
Joint in dispenser
Explosion (1) Highly compressed hydrogen energy
Burst (1) Filling hoseIn the USA, the accidents include two fires at hydrogen
fueling stations. Both the fire accidents started because of
leakage I. One of them involved the release of approximately
300 kg of hydrogen over 2.5 h at the AC transit hydrogen
fueling station in Emeryville; this accident has been covered in
detail by Harris et al. [35]. They reported that the nozzle sub-
assembly portion of the pressure relief valve failed, causing
an immediate release of approximately 30 kg of hydrogen in
the first minute. This rapidly released hydrogen mixed with
air in the vent tube, and this mixture subsequently ignited,
producing a loud “boom,” as reported by eye and ear wit-
nesses. After the pre-mixed gases were consumed, the vent-
ing hydrogen produced a jet flame emanating from the outlet
of the vent system. The root cause was improper material
selection in a sub-component of the pressure relief valve. In
the second fire incident, a fire began in the compression skid
of a high-pressure hydrogen fueling station. The initial source
of fire was likely to be the release of hydrogen from a failed
weld on a pressure switch.Discussion
Fig. 1 shows the tree diagram of the incidents and accidents
involving hydrogen fueling stations in (a) Japan and (b) the
USA. The cause of leakage I in Japan and the USA is mainly
design error, that is, poorly planned fatigue. Regulations
regarding fatigue pertain to the rule of material selection. In
Japan, the materials that can be used in hydrogen environ-
ments are seriously restricted; for example, only steels that
have a certain relationship among its nickel equivalent, tem-
perature, and pressure can be used. The National Aeronautics
and Space Administration has provided guidelines for
hydrogen system design, materials selection, operations,
storage, and transportation [36]. Thus, the USA also has reg-
ulations regarding materials for hydrogen embrittlement.ydrogen fueling stations in Japan from 2005 to 2014.
s Cause
Design error (fatigue)
Design error (fatigue)
Design error (fatigue)
(screw joint) Inadequate torque
(screw joint) Inadequate torque
Inadequate torque
se (screw joint) Inadequate sealing
ulator (screw joint) Inadequate torque
Inadequate torque
nt) Inadequate torque
w joint) Inadequate sealing
Inadequate torque
Inadequate sealing
Inadequate sealing
Manufacturing error
enser Inadequate sealing
Inadequate sealing
Human error
Natural disaster (earthquake)
generator Design error
Design error (fatigue)
Table 3 e Classification of accidents and incidents involving hydrogen fueling stations in the USA from 2004 to 2012.
Incident type Apparatus & parts Cause
Leakage I (4) Crankshaft bearing of compressor Design error (fatigue)
Welded part of pipe Design error (fatigue)
Pressure relief valve Design error (nonconforming material use)
Filling hose Poor maintenance
Leakage II (6) Joint in filling system Inadequate sealing
Joint of cylinder surrounding accumulator (screw joint) Inadequate sealing
Joint between LH2 lorry and LH2 pipeline (flange joint) Inadequate sealing
Valve in LH2 pipeline Inadequate torque
Valve Inadequate torque
Valve Inadequate sealing
Leakage III (3) Filling hose Human error
Flexible hose from LH2 lorry Human error
Valve Human error
Burst (5) Emergency detaching coupler Malfunction
Emergency detaching coupler External impact
Compressor Manufacturing error
Compressor head fastener Design error
LH2 lorry Human error
Others (4) Filling system e FCV Human error
Filling system e FCV Human error
Hose Human error
Adapter Manufacturing error
Fig. 1 e Tree diagram of incidents and accidents involving hydrogen fueling stations in (a) Japan (b) the USA.
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metal fatigue although materials suitable for hydrogen envi-
ronments were used. The cause of these incidents and acci-
dents is design error, that is, the misestimation of loads that
can be applied to components. Considering the present in-
cidents in Japan and the USA, it is very important to
adequately consider the usage environment in the design.
However, fatigue-related problems generally appear after
long-term use; therefore, it is necessary to continue focusing
on the causes of incidents after long-term use.In Japan, leakage II mainly occurs around a screw joint. A
major difference between hydrogen fueling stations in Japan
and theUSA is thepipe jointmethod. In Japan,most of the pipes
are joinedviascrewjoints;ontheotherhand, intheUSA,mostof
the pipes are joined viawelding joints.Moreover, in general, the
number of joints in a hydrogen fueling station in Japan is larger
than that in theUSA. Japan'sHighPressureGasSafetyActallows
the use ofwelding joints in hydrogen fueling stations. However,
Japanese business operators do not use welding joints in
hydrogen fueling stations probably because screw joints
i n t e rn a t i o n a l j o u r n a l o f h y d r o g e n en e r g y 4 1 ( 2 0 1 6 ) 2 1 5 6 4e2 1 5 7 021568facilitate easy maintenance and complex layouts might make
welding operations difficult. Further, the lack of data on the
material strength of welded parts in high-pressure hydrogen
environments and the difficulty of ensuring that welded parts
have sufficient strength considering thepipe thickness required
for carrying hydrogen are themain reasons for the use of screw
joints. Actually, the serious fire incident in the USAwas caused
by leakage fromwelded parts. Therefore, it might be important
to obtain data on the strength of welded parts and develop
technology and techniques for reducing the pipe thickness in
hydrogen environments.
The primary cause of leakage III is human error. One of the
incidents in theUSA occurred because of an erroneous start by
an FCV user, which subsequently resulted in the filling hose
being broken. Incidents due to errors by FCV users have never
been reported in Japan. This might be because Japanese reg-
ulations prohibit self-serviced hydrogen fueling stations.
However, in the near future, self-serviced hydrogen fueling
stations might become operational in Japan. Therefore, it
might be necessary to provide safety measures to prevent
human errors by FCV users. In the initial stage of the spread of
compressed natural gas stations in Japan, the number of ac-
cidents due to erroneous start by users was large. One of the
main causes of the accidents was the nonoperation of the
emergency detaching coupler. Therefore, to prevent such ac-
cidents, the structure of the coupler used in hydrogen fueling
stations has been reformed.
Fig. 2 shows the details of the positions and parts involved
in the incidents and accidents at hydrogen fueling stations in
Japan and the USA. The facilities, chemical substances, and
chemical substance states depend on the type of hydrogen
fueling stations. Thus, risk analysis should be performed and
safety measures devised for each type of hydrogen fueling
station. Most incidents examined in this study occurred inFig. 2 e Details of positions and parts involved in incidents and afacilities commonly used in all types of hydrogen fueling
stations, e.g., joints, compressors, and dispensers. One inci-
dent reported in the HIRD was peculiar to a liquid hydrogen
fueling station. Here is an excerpt from the database: “In the
liquid hydrogen fueling station in the U.S., during transfer of
liquid hydrogen from a commercial tank trailer to a receiving
vessel, a leakage developed in a bayonet fitting at the trailer/
facility connection. The leakage produced liquid hydrogen
spray which enveloped the rear of the truck where the hand-
operated shutoff valve was located. Emergency trained
personnel, wearing protective clothing, except for proper
shoes, entered the area and shut off the flow control valve.
Reentry personnel suffered frost bite of their feet when shoes
became frozen to the water-wetted rear deck of the truck. A
loose hose flange connection allowed leakage of cold fluid
through the lubricated bayonet seal. This allowed cold fluid to
contact and shrink the ‘O’ ring seal (made of Buna-N rubber),
thus permitting liquid hydrogen leakage to the atmosphere.”
In the case of liquid hydrogen fueling stations, the hydrogen
temperature range is larger than that in the case of gaseous
hydrogen fueling stations. This is likely to lead to low-
temperature embrittlement and thermal fatigue of compo-
nent materials and may damage the materials. Moreover,
liquid hydrogen leakage might induce not only fire and ex-
plosion but also frostbite.Conclusions
In this study, incidents and accidents involving hydrogen
fueling stations in Japan and the USA were classified and
analyzed considering the regulations in these countries. The
findings and conclusions of the study are as follows:ccidents at hydrogen fueling stations in Japan and the USA.
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error, that is, poorly planned fatigue. Considering the pre-
sent incidents in Japan and the USA, it is very important to
adequately consider the usage environment in the design.
2. In Japan, leakage II is mainly caused by screw joints. If
welded joints are to be used in hydrogen fueling stations in
Japan, it might be important to obtain data on the strength
of welded parts and develop technology and techniques for
reducing the pipe thickness in hydrogen environments.
3. The main cause of leakage III in Japan and the USA is
human error. To realize self-serviced hydrogen fueling
stations, safety measures should be developed to prevent
human error by FCV users.Funding
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